Valence, Complementarities, and Political Polarization

Philipp Denter

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: I study a model of electoral competition where two parties that care about both the spoils of office and policy compete by announcing policy platforms. Parties are characterized by their valence on the one hand and by their policy platforms on the other. Unlike in the extant literature, I assume that valence and policy are complements (instead of substitutes) from the voter's perspective. I generally characterize electoral equilibrium and show that in such a framework increasing one or both parties' valence level(s) leads to policy moderation. To the contrary, if both candidates have minimal valence policy platforms are maximally polarized. The model hence uncovers valence as an important determinant of political polarization.

Keywords: electoral competition; valence; policy; complements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ore and nep-pol
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97396/1/MPRA_paper_97396.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Valence, complementarities, and political polarization (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:97396

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