No moral wiggles in e5 and e1,000 dictator games under ambiguity

Pablo Brañas-Garza, Jaromír Kovářík and Maria del Carmen Lopez-Martin

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper explores excuse-driven behavior in giving. In our powered laboratory experiment, participants play Dictator Games sharing 5e or 1,000e under certainty or ambiguity with a charity. In contrast to previous papers using MPLs {that necessarily introduce additional layers of uncertainty{our subjects participate in two DGs. We �nd no evidence that people use moral wiggles to hide their sel�shness. They share equally out of 5e under certainty and ambiguity and as much out of 1,000e under ambiguity as they do under certainty in the previous literature. These �findings raise the question whether previous results might be an artifact.

Keywords: Giving; charity; uncertainty; ambiguity; stakes. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:98132

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