Executive Absolutism: A Model
William Howell,
Kenneth Shepsle and
Stephane Wolton ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
Separated powers cannot permanently constrain individual ambitions. Concerns about a government's ability to respond to contemporary and future crises, we show, invariably compromise the principled commitments one branch of government has in limiting the authority of another. We study a dynamic model in which a politician (most commonly an executive) makes authority claims that are subject to a hard constraint (administered, typically, by a court). At any period, the court is free to rule against the executive and thereby permanently halt her efforts to acquire more power. Because it appropriately cares about the executive's ability to address real-world disruptions, however, the court is always willing to affirm more authority. Neither robust electoral competition nor alternative characterizations of judicial rule fundamentally alters this state of affairs. The result, we show, is a persistent accumulation of executive authority.
Keywords: Authority; Executive Growh; Judicial Decision; Separation of Power; Federalist (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D02 D70 D72 H11 K39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-law and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:98221
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