Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions

Kenju Kamei

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper experimentally studies individuals’ voluntary disclosure of past behaviors and its effects in a finitely repeated two-player public goods game. The experiment data found that voluntary information disclosure strengthens cooperation under certain conditions, although a non-negligible fraction of individuals do not disclose information about the past and proceed to behave opportunistically. On closer inspection, the data revealed that the material incentives of disclosure acts differ according to the matching protocol. Specifically, disclosers receive higher payoffs than non-disclosers if the disclosers are assured to be matched with like-minded disclosers; conversely, disclosers are vulnerable to exploitation by others under random matching. These results suggest that mandatory disclosure helps enhance economic efficiency if individuals’ hiding and uncooperative behaviors are liable to precipitate a collapse in the community norms.

Keywords: experiment; information disclosure; cooperation; dilemma; repeated games; reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/98256/1/MPRA_paper_98256.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Voluntary disclosure of information and cooperation in simultaneous-move economic interactions (2020)
Working Paper: Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:98256

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