Terrorist Inter-Group Cooperation and Terror Activity

Aditya Bhan and Tarun Kabiraj

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper shows that in the absence of external sponsorship, strategic cooperation between two outfits has no impact on terror activity, if neither outfit is resource-constrained a priori. If only one outfit is resource-constrained a priori, inter-group cooperation increases terror activity if and only if there is sufficient resource-asymmetry between the outfits. Further, if both outfits are resource-constrained a priori, then cooperation may increase or decrease terror activity, depending on parametric asymmetries. Finally, it is demonstrated that while cooperation can neutralize the impact of strategic external sponsorship on terror activity and thereby remove the incentive for its provision, there is always some external sponsorship mechanism which can be utilized to enhance terror activity.

Keywords: Terror outfit; Terror attacks; Non-cooperative competition; Outfit cooperation; Sponsorship fund; Counter terrorism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D74 H79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:98484

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