Two-worker competition in gift-exchange: assessing intention-based reciprocity and inequity aversion

Francesco Bogliacino and Nicolás Rodríguez González

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this article, we study a three-person gift exchange, where two workers compete for a bonus. We derive the equilibrium properties of the models of sequential reciprocity and inequity aversion. We then prove a comparative statics theorem, when one worker becomes more productive. We show that compared with the predictions of outcome based model, those of the intention based model contrast sharply. This creates an ideal setting in which to perform a controlled experiment to test them. Our results largely support sequential reciprocity.

Keywords: Gift exchange; sequential reciprocity; inequity aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C72 C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:99055

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