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Independent Directors’ Tenure, Expropriation, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Value: The Role of Ownership Concentration in Malaysian Publicly Listed Corporations

Chee Liew and S.Susela Devi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This chapter analyses the relationship between related party transactions (RPT) and firm value and whether independent directors' tenure (IDT) strengthens or weakens this relationship. Further, it examines ownership concentration's role on this moderating effect of IDT in Malaysian family and non-family corporations. It is found that that IDT weakens the relationship between RPT and firm value. However, ownership concentration strengthens this moderating effect of IDT. Interestingly, family corporations are more likely to show a stronger impact of ownership concentration which we allude to concerns of maintaining reputation. The research results remain after controlling for technology corporations. The findings' have important implications for policy makers, practitioners and regulators, especially in emerging economies globally

Keywords: Agency Conflict; Corporate Financial Valuation; Independent Directors' Term in the Office; Corporate Governance; Family Corporations; Emerging Markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G0 G00 G30 G32 G34 G39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-03-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-gen and nep-sea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Handbook of Research on Accounting and Financial Studies Chapter 9 (2020): pp. 182-207

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