Talking about Monetary Policy: The Virtues (and Vices?) of Central Bank Communication

Alan Blinder

No 1048, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies.

Abstract: Central banks, which used to be so secretive, are communicating more and more these days about their monetary policy. This development has proceeded hand in glove with a burgeoning new scholarly literature on the subject. The empirical evidence, reviewed selectively here, suggests that communication can move financial markets, enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions, and perhaps even help central banks achieve their goals. A number of theoretical drawbacks to greater communication are also reviewed here. None seems very important in practice. That said, no consensus has yet emerged regarding what constitutes "optimal" communication strategy?either in quantity or nature.

Keywords: monetary; policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Working Paper: Talking about monetary policy: the virtues (and vice?) of central bank communication (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:cepsud:164

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