Central Bank Independence and Credibility During and After a Crisis

Alan Blinder

No 1401, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies.

Abstract: Unlike my distinguished fellow panelists, I am not the head of a central bank. So I take my marching orders from the conference organizers. In this case, they asked me to ruminate on the extent to which central banks? independence and credibility have been affected by their actions during the crisis. So that's what I'll do.

Keywords: central banks; bank policy; financial crisis; monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E00 E42 E50 E58 E60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:cepsud:229

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