What Does the Public Know about Economic Policy, and How Does It Know It?

Alan Blinder and Alan Krueger

No 103, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies.

Abstract: A long tradition in economic theory models economic policy decisions as solutions to optimization problems solved by rational and well-informed agents: A single policymaker minimizes a loss function subject to some constraints. Another body of literature models policy decisions as if they were made by well-informed voters in elections of some sort.

JEL-codes: D12 D72 E60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (226)

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Related works:
Journal Article: What Does the Public Know about Economic Policy, and How Does It Know It? (2004)
Working Paper: What Does the Public Know about Economic Policy, and How Does It Know It? (2004)
Working Paper: What Does the Public Know about Economic Policy, and How Does It Know It? (2004)
Working Paper: What Does the Public Know about Economic Policy, and How Does It Know It? (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:cepsud:99

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