Amendment Voting with Incomplete Preferences

Xiaosheng Mu
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Xiaosheng Mu: Columbia University

Working Papers from Princeton University. Economics Department.

Abstract: We study the outcome of the amendment voting procedure based on a potentially incomplete preference relation. A decision-maker evaluates candidates in a list and iteratively updates her choice by comparing the status-quo to the next candidate. She favors the status-quo when the two candidates are incomparable according to her un-derlying preference. Developing a revealed preference approach; we characterize all choice functions that can arise from such a procedure and discuss to what extent the underlying preference can be identified from observed choices.

Keywords: Amendment voting; Choice from lists; Status-quo bias; Revealed-preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:econom:2019-29

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