The Effect of Occupational Licensing Stringency on the Teacher Quality Distribution
Bradley Larsen (),
Adam Kapor and
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Ziao Ju: Stanford University
Adam Kapor: Princeton University
Chuan Yu: Stanford University
Working Papers from Princeton University. Economics Department.
Concerned about the low academic ability of public school teachers, in the 1990s and 2000s, some states increased licensing stringency to weed out low-quality candidates, while others decreased restrictions to attract high-quality candidates. We offer a theoretical model justifying both reactions. Using data from 1991â€“2007 on licensing requirements and teacher qualityâ€”as measured by the selectivity of teachersâ€™ undergraduate institutionsâ€”we find that stricter licensing requirements, especially those emphasizing academic coursework, increase the left tail of the quality distribution for secondary school teachers without significantly decreasing quality for high-minority or high-poverty districts.
Keywords: Education; Teacher licensing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I2 J2 J4 J5 K2 K31 L5 L8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: The Effect of Occupational Licensing Stringency on the Teacher Quality Distribution (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:econom:2020-3
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