Lindahl Equilibrium as a Collective Choice Rule

Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
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Faruk Gul: Princeton University
Wolfgang Pesendorfer: Princeton University

Working Papers from Princeton University. Economics Department.

Abstract: A collective choice problem is a finite set of social alternatives and a finite set of economic agents with vNM utility functions. We associate a public goods economy with each collective choice problem and establish the existence and efficiency of (equal income) Lindahl equilibrium allocations. We interpret collective choice problems as cooperative bargaining problems and define a set-valued solution concept, the equitable solution (ES).We provide axioms that characterize ES and show that ES contains the Nash bargaining solution. Our main result shows that the set of ES payoffs is the same a the set of Lindahl equilibrium payoffs. We consider two applications: in the first, we show that in a large class of matching problems without transfers the set of Lindahl equilibrium payoffs is the same as the set of (equal income) Walrasian equilibrium payoffs. In our second application, we show that in any discrete exchange economy without transfers every Walrasian equilibrium payoff is a Lindahl equilibrium payoff of the corresponding collective choice market. Moreover, for any cooperative bargaining problem, it is possible to define a set of commodities so that the resulting economy’s utility possibility set is that bargaining problem and the resulting economy’s set of Walrasian equilibrium payoffs is the same as the set of Lindahl equilibrium payoffs of the corresponding collective choice market.

Keywords: collective; choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:econom:2021-52

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