The Effect of Final-Offer Arbitration on the Salaries of Municipal Police Officers in New Jersey
No 509, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.
This study investigates the effect of final-offer arbitration on the salaries of municipal police officers in New Jersey using a regression model to control for the possible biases introduced by non-random use of the procedure. The results indicate that, despite the greater fraction of union victories than employer victories under final-offer arbitration, arbitrated salary settlements are not significantly higher or lower than nonarbitrated settlements. The results also contain evidence of asymmetric behavior by the parties under final-offer arbitration with the unions appearing more risk averse than the employers.
JEL-codes: L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:indrel:129
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