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The Pitfalls in Judging Arbitrator Impartiality by Win-Loss Tallies Under Final-Offer Arbitration

Orley Ashenfelter () and David Bloom

No 543, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.

Abstract: This paper contains some early results of a longer term empirical study of a New Jersey arbitration statute that covers police officers and firefighters. The purpose of this larger study is twofold. First, we hope to shed some light on how differences in the structure of arbitration mechanisms affect the size and frequency of negotiated settlements as well as arbitration outcomes. This is possible in New Jersey because the same panel of arbitrators administers both final-offer and conventional arbitra- tion systems simultaneously. Second, it is our view that arbitration systems share much in common with other judicial and quasi-judicial dispute settlement mechanisms. It is our hope to shed some light on the more general issues surrounding the design and evaluation of these systems through the much needed empirical study of the operation of one such system. In this paper we report some important results for the interpreta- tion and evaluation of arbitrator impartiality under the New Jersey sta- tute. We suspect these results are equally relevant for the interpretation of other arbitration experiences.

JEL-codes: M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1983-05
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