Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence From Indonesia

Lisa Cameron

No 724, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.

Abstract: Implementing the ultimatum game experimentally in Indonesia makes it possible to raise the stakes to three times the monthly expenditure of the average participant. Contrary to predictions in the literature, the results show no evidence of approaching the sub-game perfect, selfish outcomes. Responders seem to be just as willing to reject a given percentage offer at high stakes as at low stakes, and Proposers make slightly less selfish offers as the stakes increase.

Keywords: experimental economics; ultimatum game; large stakes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Journal Article: Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:indrel:345

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