Do Unemployment Insurance Recipients Actively Seek Work? Randomized Trials in Four U.S. States

Orley Ashenfelter, David Ashmore and Olivier Deschenes
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No 791, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.

Abstract: In this paper we report the results of randomized trials designed to measure whether stricter enforcement and verification of work search behavior alone decreases unemployment insurance (Ul) claims and benefits. These experiments were designed to explicitly test claims based on nonexperimental data, that a prime cause of overpayment is the failure of claimants to actively seek work. Our results provide no support for the view that the failure to actively search for work has been a cause of overpayment in the UI system.

Keywords: unemployment insurance; work search requirements; randomized trials (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Do Unemployment Insurance Recipients Actively Seek Work? Randomized Trials in Four U.S. States (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:indrel:412

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