Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games
Dirk Bergemann and
Stephen Morris
Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program.
Abstract:
The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes correlated equilibrium. A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game, given by actions sets and payoff functions, and an information structure. We identify a partial order on many player information structures (individual sufficiency) under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.
Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; incomplete information; robust predictions; information structure; su¢ ciency; Blackwell ordering (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games (2016) 
Working Paper: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games (2015) 
Working Paper: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games (2015) 
Working Paper: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games (2014) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:metric:054-2013
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