Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

Takuo Sugaya
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Takuo Sugaya: Princeton University

No 1303, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program.

Abstract: We show that the folk theorm with individually rational payoffs defined by pure strategies generically holds for a general N-player repeated game with private monitoring when the number of each player's signals is sufficiently large. No cheap talk communication device or public randomization device is necessary.

Keywords: repeated game; folk theorm; private monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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