A Kink that Makes You Sick: the Effect of Sick Pay on Absence in a Social Insurance System
Petri Böckerman (),
Ohto Kanninen and
Ilpo Suoniemi
No 297, Working Papers from Työn ja talouden tutkimus LABORE, The Labour Institute for Economic Research LABORE
Abstract:
We examine the effect of the replacement rate of a social insurance system on sickness absence by exploiting a regression kink design. The elasticity of absence with respect to the benefit level, in addition to risk preferences, is a critical parameter in defining the optimal sickness insurance scheme. Using a large administrative dataset, we find a robust behavioral response. The statistically significant point estimate of the elasticity of the duration of sickness absence with respect to the replacement rate in a social insurance system is on the order of 1. Given our estimate, we characterize the optimal benefit level.
Keywords: Sick pay; labor supply; sickness absence; regression kink design; social insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H55 I13 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2015-11-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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https://labore.fi/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Tyopapereita-297.pdf First version, 2015 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: A Kink that Makes You Sick: the Effect of Sick Pay on Absence in a Social Insurance System (2014) 
Working Paper: A Kink that Makes you Sick: the Effect of Sick Pay on Absence in a Social Insurance System (2014) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pst:wpaper:297
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