Recommended Play and Correlated Equilibria: An Experimental Study

Timothy Cason and Tridib Sharma

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This study reports a laboratory experiment wherein subjects play a hawk-dove game. We try to implement a correlated equilibrium with payoffs outside the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoffs by privately recommending play. We find that subjects are reluctant to follow certain recommendations. We are able to implement this correlated equilibrium, however, when subjects play against robots that always follow recommendations, including in a control treatment in which human subjects receive the robot "earnings." This indicates that the lack of mutual knowledge of conjectures, rather than social preferences, explains subjects' failure to play the suggested correlated equilibrium when facing other human players.

Keywords: Game Theory; Experiments; Coordination; Common Knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2006-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-knm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Recommended play and correlated equilibria: an experimental study (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1191

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