Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability

Kai Konrad and Dan Kovenock

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players abilities are stochastic, but become common knowledge before efforts are expended. Players whose expected ability is lower than that of their rivals may still earn a positive expected payoff from participating in the contest, which may explain why they participate. We also show that an increase in the dispersion of a player s own ability generally benefits this player. It may benefit or harm his rival, but cannot benefit the rival more than it benefits himself. We also explore the role of stochastic ability for sequential contests with the same opponent (multi-battle contests) and with varying opponents (elimination tournaments) and show that it reduces the strong discouragement effects and hold-up problems that may otherwise emerge in such games. High own ability dispersion selects such players into the contest and favors them in elimination contests.

Keywords: All-Pay Auctions; Elimination Tournament; Contest; Race; Conflict; Multi-Stage; Random Ability; Discouragement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2006-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1192

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