Communication and Coordination in the Laboratory Collective Resistance Game

Timothy Cason and Vai-Lam Mui

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper presents a laboratory collective resistance (CR) game to study how different forms of non-binding communication among responders can help coordinate their collective resistance against a leader who transgresses against them. Contrary to the predictions of analysis based on purely self-regarding preferences, we find that non-binding communication about intended resistance increases the incidence of no transgression even in the one-shot laboratory CR game. In particular, we find that the incidence of no transgression increases from 7 percent with no communication up to 25-37 percent depending on whether communication occurs before or after the leader s transgression decision. Responders messages are different when the leaders can observe them, and the leaders use the observed messages to target specific responders for transgression.

Keywords: Communication; Cheap Talk; Collective Resistance; Laboratory Experiment; Social Preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2006-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://business.purdue.edu/research/Working-papers-series/2006/1197.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Communication and coordination in the laboratory collective resistance game (2007)
Working Paper: COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION IN THE LABORATORY COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE GAME (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1197

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Business PHD ().