Communication, Commitment, and Deception in Social Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence

Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari and Maria Bigoni

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Social norms of cooperation are studied under several forms of communication. In an experiment, strangers could make public statements before playing a prisoner s dilemma. The interaction was repeated indefinitely, which generated multiple equilibria. Communication could be used as a tool to either signal intentions to coordinate on Pareto-superior outcomes, to deceive others, or to credibly commit to actions. Some forms of communication did not promote the incidence of efficient Nash play, and sometimes reduced it. Surprisingly, cooperation suffered when subjects could publicly commit to actions.

Keywords: coordination; cheap-talk; deception; indefinitely repeated game; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2010-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Communication, commitment, and deception in social dilemmas: experimental evidence (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1236

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