The Non-Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto Game

Brian Roberson and Dmitriy Kvasov

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The Colonel Blotto game is a two-player constant-sum game in which each player simultaneously distributes his fixed level of resources across a set of contests. In the traditional formulation of the Colonel Blotto game, the players resources are use it or lose it in the sense that any resources which are not allocated to one of the contests are forfeited. This article examines a non-constant-sum version of the Colonel Blotto game which relaxes this use it or lose it feature. We find that if the level of asymmetry between the players budgets is below a threshold, then there exists a oneto- one mapping from the unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal distribution functions in the constant-sum game to those in the non-constant-sum game. Once the asymmetry of the players budgets exceeds the threshold this relationship breaks down and we construct a new equilibrium.

Keywords: Colonel Blotto Game; All-Pay Auction; Contests; Mixed Strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2010-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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https://business.purdue.edu/research/Working-papers-series/2010/1252.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game (2012)
Working Paper: The Non-Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto Game (2010)
Working Paper: The Non-Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto Game (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1252

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