Dynamic Efficiency in Experimental Emissions Trading Markets with Investment Uncertainty

Timothy Cason and Frans de Vries

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This study employs a laboratory experiment to assess the performance of tradable permit markets on dynamic efficiency arising from cost-reducing investment. The permit allocation rule is the main treatment variable, with permits being fully auctioned or grandfathered. The experimental results show significant investment under both allocation rules in the presence of ex ante uncertainty over the actual investment outcome. However, auctioning permits generally provides stronger incentives to invest in R&D, leading to greater dynamic efficiency compared to grandfathering.

Keywords: Pollution permits; Allowance auction; Grandfathering (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D80 O31 Q55 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2018-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-exp and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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https://business.purdue.edu/research/working-paper ... 313_Dyn_Eff_Perm.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic Efficiency in Experimental Emissions Trading Markets with Investment Uncertainty (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1313

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