Contingent Reasoning and Dynamic Public Goods Provision

Evan Calford and Timothy Cason

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Contributions toward public goods often reveal information that is useful to others considering their own contributions. This experiment compares static and dynamic contribution decisions to determine how contingent reasoning differs in dynamic decisions where equilibrium requires understanding how future information can inform about prior events. This identifies partially cursed individuals who can only extract partial information from contingent events, others who are better at extracting information from past rather than future or concurrent events, and Nash players who effectively perform contingent thinking. Contrary to equilibrium, the dynamic provision mechanism does not lead to lower contributions than the static mechanism.

Keywords: Cursed equilibrium; Voluntary contributions; Club goods; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D71 D91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 68 pages
Date: 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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https://business.purdue.edu/research/working-papers-series/2023/1336.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Contingent Reasoning and Dynamic Public Goods Provision (2024)
Working Paper: Contingent Reasoning and Dynamic Public Goods Provision (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1336

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