Public Leaderboard Feedback in Sampling Competition: An Experimental Investigation

Stanton Hudja, Brian Roberson and Yaroslav Rosokha

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We investigate the role of performance feedback, in the form of a public leaderboard, in a sequential-sampling contest with costly observations. We show theoretically that for contests with a fixed ending date (i.e., finite horizon), providing public performance feedback may result in fewer expected observations and a lower expected value of the winning observation. We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to test the theoretical predictions, and find that the experimental results largely support the theory. In addition, we investigate how individual characteristics affect competitive sequential-sampling activity.

JEL-codes: C72 C90 D83 D90 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2022-09
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1346

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