PRIVATE INFORMATION AND OPTIMAL CONTRACTS IN THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO INVENTIVE ACTIVITY

John Weinberg

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Keywords: investments; information; inventions; incentives; shares (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 1990
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:993

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Business PHD ().