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Private Benefits, Fiscal Costs, and Economic Resource Costs of the Private Defined Contribution Pension Systems in Turkey

Glenn Jenkins (), Godwin Olasehinde-Williams () and Roya Amel ()
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Roya Amel: Department of Banking and Finance, Eastern Mediterranean University, North Cyprus

No 2019-02, Development Discussion Papers from JDI Executive Programs

Abstract: This study addresses economic issues associated with the private defined benefit pension system in Turkey. The institutional arrangements in Turkey for administering the government securities held in such pensions are compared with two private defined contribution pension schemes in Canada. In Canada, pension participants can hold the insured securities of banks instead of government securities. In turn banks charge no management fees on pension accounts that hold such securities. In the Turkish private pension system, more than 20% of the total value of the pension investments in government bonds are lost through administration costs. In addition, there is a net fiscal cost to the Treasury of Turkey. Although the net return received by pension holders is approximately the same as in the Turkish system, taxes are fully collected in Canada on either the proceeds of the pensions or on the taxable income used to finance the private pension assets.

Keywords: Private pensions; Turkey; pension administration costs; economic resource cost; Canada (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 J26 J32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age and nep-ara
Date: 2019-02
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