Social Insurance And Redistribution

Robin Boadway, Manuel Leite-Monteiro, Maurice Marchand and Pierre Pestieau
Additional contact information
Maurice Marchand: Universite Catholique de Louvain

No 1004, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper studies optimal linear income taxation and redistributive social insurance when the former has the traditional labor distortion and the latter generates both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. Private insurance is available and individuals differ in labor productivity and in loss probability. We show that government intervention in insurance markets is welfare-improving, and social insurance is generally desirable when there is a negative correlation between labor productivity and loss probability.

Keywords: Redistribution; Moral Hazard; Social Insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 H51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2002-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_1004.pdf First version 2002 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Social insurance and redistribution (2003)
Working Paper: Social insurance and redistribution (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1004

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