Commitment And Matching Contributions To Public Goods

Robin Boadway, Jean-François Tremblay and Zhen Song

No 1067, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper studies multi-stage processes of non-cooperative voluntary provision of public goods. In the first stage, one or more players announce contributions that may be conditional on the subsequent contributions of others. In later stages, players choose their own contributions and fulfill any commitments made in the first stage. Equilibrium contributions are characterized under different assumptions about the commitment ability of players, the number of public goods and whether players commit to matching rates or to discrete quantities. We focus on contribution mechanisms thatcan emerge and be sustainable without a central authority, and that therefore may be particularly relevant for theprovision of international public goods. Efficient levels of public goods can be achieved under some circumstances.

Keywords: voluntary provision; matching contributions; commitment; multiple public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2006-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_1067.pdf First version 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Commitment and matching contributions to public goods (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1067

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