Disobedience And Authority
John Matsusaka () and
Jan Zabojnik ()
No 1109, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University
Keywords: Delegation; Authority; Separation Costs; Optimal employment contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J63 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 0 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1109
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