The Poor, The Rich And The Enforcer: Institutional Choice And Growth

Cyril Monnet, Erwan Quintin () and Thorsten Koeppl

No 1150, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Keywords: Enforcement as a Choice; Institutions; Inequality; Human and Physical Capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D52 O11 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2007-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-hap and nep-hrm
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https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_1150.pdf First version 2007 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The poor, the rich and the enforcer: institutional choice and growth (2008)
Working Paper: The Poor, the Rich and the Enforcer: Institutional Choice and Growth (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1150

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