The Extractive Firm's Cost Spillover Tax For The Extended Hotelling Model

Andrei Bazhanov, John Hartwick and Zhen Song

No 1169, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: We consider a competitive extraction industry comprising many small firms, each with a slightly different quality of mineral holdings. With "rapidly" declining quality of holding per fi rm we observe rent declining over an interval. We then take up the familiar planning model and isolate the tax required to make decentralized extraction by many distinct, competitive fi rms replicate the planning solution.

Keywords: exhaustible resources; resource rent; competitive extraction; corrective tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D41 Q31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2007-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1169

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