Wages And Seniority When Coworkers Matter: Estimating A Joint Production Economy Using Norwegian Administrative Data

Christopher Ferrall, Kjell G Salvanes and Erik S
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Erik S: Norwegian School of Economics
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Erik Ø. Sørensen

No 1200, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: We develop an equilibrium model of wages and estimate it using administrative data from Norway. Coworkers interact through a task-assignment model, and wages are determined through multi-lateral bargaining over the surplus that accrues to the workforce. Seniority affects wages through workplace output and relative bargaining power. These channels are separately identified by imposing equilibrium restrictions on data observing all workers within workplaces. We find joint production is important. Seniority affects bargaining power but is unproductive. We reinterpret gender and firm-size effects in wages in light of the rejection of linearly separable production.

Keywords: Wage Distributions; Productivity; Matched Data; Multilateral Bargaining; Assignment Models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D2 J24 J3 J7 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2009-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-lab
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_1200.pdf First version 2009 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Wages and Seniority When Coworkers Matter: Estimating a Joint Production Economy Using Norwegian Administrative Data (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1200

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