"reverse" Intergovernmental Transfers Between Regions With Local Public Goods

John Hartwick

No 1221, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: We report on the nature of a utility optimizing transfer fromone regional government to another when local public goods are present. Computer examples reveal that small differences in regional endowments result in large differences in equilibrium outcomes for two regions, under optimal transfers. The scale effect (lower tax charge per person for the same public good in more populous regions) leads to the small region generally providing transfers to the larger region.

Keywords: intergovernmental transfers; local public goods; inter-regional resource allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 H77 R28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2009-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/wpaper/qed_wp_1221.pdf First version 2009 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1221

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark Babcock ().