Monitoring To Reduce Agency Costs: Examining The Behavior Of Independent And Non-independent Boards

Anita Anand, Frank Milne and Lynnette Purda
Additional contact information
Anita Anand: University of Toronto
Lynnette Purda: Queen's University

No 1243, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Agency Costs; Monitoring; Independent Boards (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D G K L (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2010-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-cta
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1243

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