Persistence of Power: Repeated Multilateral Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda Setting Authority
Christopher Cotton () and
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Marina Agranov: California Institute of Technology
Chloe Tergiman: Penn State University
No 1414, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University
In models of dynamic multilateral bargaining, the literature tends to focus on stationary subgame perfect or stationary Markov perfect equilibria, which restrict attention to forward-looking, history-independent strategies. Evidence supporting such refinements come from environments in which proposal power is exogenous and the incentives for players to develop cooperative relationships are minimized. However, in many environments including legislative bargaining, agenda-setting power is endogenous and it is commonplace for players to form coalitions and establish reputations. Through a series of lab experiments, we show that in repeated environments, standard equilibrium refinements may predict some aspects of the data when outcomes when proposal power is randomly assigned, but do not predict outcomes when proposal power is endogenous.
Keywords: legislative bargaining; laboratory experiment; history independence; repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D02 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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