The Coase Theorem: Equilibrium Outcomes with Externalities

Nancy Olewiler

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: The Coase theorem has been interpreted to mean that the assignment of property rights have no effects on the allocation of resources in a competitive economy with externalities. The paper attempts to clarify the role of the Coase theorem by considering the effects of property rights on equilibrium outcomes. Two interpretations are given and show Coase's theorem to be invalid for particular externality cases. Non-cooperative equilibria is stressed as a more appropriate technique for the analysis of externality problems.

Pages: 29
Date: 1977
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:258

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark Babcock ().