The Efficiency Rationale of Antidumping Policy and Other Measures of Contingency Protection

Klaus Stegemann

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: Why would it be in the interest of any country to prevent producers in other countries from supplying it with imports that are "abnormally cheap"? Three types of domestic distortions are discussed: a pure distortion of domestic income distribution; short-sightedness of domestic buyers; and price distortions in the import-competing country. The efficiency rationale of existing contingency policies is found wanting. Existing procedures may serve as a smoke screen preventing the use of more efficient forms of justified intervention.

Pages: 79
Date: 1980
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:387

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