The Macroeconomic Implications of a Bad Poker Face

Michael Sampson

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: Game theory investigates the relationship between the Keynesian and monetarist solutions to a simple, representative, macroeconomic model. The model is a game between the private sector and the central bank. A player with a bad poker face reveals his strategy to the other player, before the other player has chosen his strategy. The Keynesian and monetarist solutions are symmetrical: if the private sector has a bad poker face, then the Keynesian solution obtains; if the central bank has a bad poker face, then the monetarist solution obtains. If both or neither players have bad poker faces, then there is no solution to the game.

Pages: 15
Date: 1982
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:462

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