Arrow's Axiom and Condorcet Voting Cycles: Exposition and Critique

John Hartwick

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: Arrow's axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives has no intuitive appeal in relating social and individual rankings in certain cases (Condorcet cycling) to cases where majority voting results in a transitive social ranking of alternatives. We suggest that if person i is decisive in a Condorcet voting cycle, there is no reason why he should be decisive when cycles would not arise under majority voting. By restricting the scope of the independence axiom, social rankings can still be generated which satisfy reasonable axioms, and Arrovian dictatorship and related outcomes are avoided.

Pages: 19
Date: 1983
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:529

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