Information, Sunk Costs and Entry Equilibria

W. Bentley Macleod ()

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper studies the effect of information and sunk costs on the set of equilibria for a dynamic oligopoly model that incorporates price and entry/exit decisions. Contrary to the accepted view, sunk costs do not act as a barrier to entry, but in general cause excessive entry. When entry and exit is costless either no equilibrium exists or the market is monopolized. Therefore, even in a homogeneous product model, free entry implies neither zero profits nor an efficient allocation of resources.

Pages: 38 pages
Date: 1985
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:596

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