Duopoly in a Model with Vertically and Horizontally Differentiated Products

Steffen Ziss ()

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper examines equilibrium in a market consisting of two sellers, each of whom produce one product which is horizontally (locationally) and vertically (qualitatively) differentiated, and many buyers. The sellers behave non-cooperatively and play a three-stage Nash game in location, quality and price. We examine the relationship between costs and differentiation, existence of equilibrium, and cost improvements and welfare. We extend the model to allow for asymmetrically observed or unobserved quality, cooperative pricing, a vertical as well as a horizontal component to market size, and less than perfect substitutability between goods.

Pages: 49 pages
Date: 1985
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:604

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark Babcock ().