Involuntary Unemployment in Dynamic Contract Equilibria

W. Bentley Macleod and James Malcomson

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: In this paper the set of bilateral wage contracts in a dynamic model with observable effort is characterized. Our first result demonstrates that bond payments and severance pay do not increase the size of the set of incentive compatible contracts. Second, we show that unobservable effort can lead to voluntary unemployment.

Pages: 10 pages
Date: 1986
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Journal Article: Involuntary unemployment in dynamic contract equilibria * (1987)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:656

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