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Intensity of Preference Under Representative Government

Dan Usher

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: Intensity of preference would be irrelevant to the outcome of public decision-making by majority-rule voting if each issue were resolved in a separate plebiscite. It is not irrelevant when issues are combined in platforms of political parties. Preference intensity can be represented as a parameter in the voter's utility function. Occasions may arise when a minority of a given size gets its way if and only if its intensity parameter is high. Minorities may also prevail by organizing to act as though their preferences were intense.

Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:686

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