Continuous Time Repeated Games of Complete Information

James Bergin

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper provides a formulation of continuous time repeated games of complete information. A substantial part of the paper is concerned with the definition of a continuous time strategy and the association of outcomes to strategies. The set of equilibria relative to these strategies is characterized in the remainder of the paper.

Pages: 39 pages
Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:706

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