Duopoly in Exhaustible Resource Exploration and Extraction

John Hartwick and Perry Sadorsky

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: Strategic considerations of exploration and extraction are investigated in a two player, two period, two stage perfect equilibrium framework. Relative to two plant monopoly, the duopolists explore more and extract more. A mixed game where there is co-operation "upstream" in exploration and Cournot competition "downstream" in quantities extracted is investigated. We also note the increasing returns to scale in exploration can introduce an unstable interior solution with a corner solution the presumed stable equilibrium.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1988
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Journal Article: Duopoly in Exhaustible Resource Exploration and Extraction (1990)
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