A Model of Strategic Behaviour in Repeated Games

James Bergin

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper develops a general repeated game model over arbitrary time domain (which includes continuous time behaviour). A player is committed at any point in time to history independent behaviour for a positive length of time. The length of time of commitment depends on the way the history evolves locally. A virtue of this approach is that none of the technical assumptions of the differential formulation (e.g. Lipschitz conditions) are required. In addition, the variable response strategy formulation allows a straightforward discussion of subgame perfection.

Keywords: game theory; economic models; economic equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 1989
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A model of strategic behaviour in repeated games (1992)
Working Paper: A model of strategic behaviour in repeated games (1990)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:751

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